A note on the Doomsday Argument by Lewis, Peter J.




Suppose the gods create either one person or two people (in succession). You find yourself newly created, and with no reason to prefer the one-person hypothesis H1 to the two-person hypothesis H2, so you assign them each a credence of 1/2. The gods now tell you that you are the first person created; call this evidence E. You reason as follows: If H1 is true, then I was bound to be the first person created, whereas is H2 is true it was equally likely that I would be the second person created. That is, P(E|H1) = 1 and P(E|H2) = 1/2. Then by a simply application of Bayes’ theorem, P(H1|E) = 2/3 and P(H2|E) = 1/3. That is, the evidence that I am the first person created confirms H1 over H2. This is the reasoning at the heart of the Doomsday Argument—the argument that knowledge of one’s birth rank confirms shorter survival times for the human species over longer ones (Bradley and Fitelson 2003).
	But the foregoing reasoning fails to take into account the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle (Elga 2000). Recall that in that case, when Beauty wakes, her credence that the coin came up heads shifts to 1/3, even though she believes the coin to be fair. This shift occurs because there are twice as many temporal locations she could occupy in the tails world (Monday or Tuesday) than in the heads world (Monday only), and one can apply a “highly restricted principle of indifference” to infer that each location should be assigned the same credence (Elga 2000,144). When Beauty subsequently learns that it is Monday, conditionalizing on this information exactly undoes the shift, and restores her credence in heads to 1/2.
	The same considerations apply here. When you find yourself newly created, you realize that there are twice as many personal locations you could occupy in the H2 world (first person or second person) than in the H1 world (first person only). This shifts your credence in H1 to 1/3 and H2 to 2/3, despite the fact that you regard the H1 world and the H2 world as intrinsically equiprobable. Then when you learn that you are the first person, conditionalizing on this information exactly undoes the shift, restoring your credence in H1 to its intrinsic value of 1/2.
	The same goes for the full Doomsday Argument. Suppose you have a uniform prior credence distribution over a number of hypotheses for the duration of the human species. When you reflect on your own location in that duration, you realize that worlds with a long-lived human species contain more possible self-locations than worlds with a short-lived human species, and this shifts your credence in favor of hypotheses of a long human duration. If you learn that your own birth rank is 1, conditionalizing on this information exactly counteracts this shift, and restores your credences to their uniform prior values. If you learn that your birth rank is k > 1, conditionalizing on this information eliminates those hypotheses with a human population less than k, and restores a uniform credence distribution over the remaining hypotheses.
	More formally, let Hi be the hypothesis that there are i humans in total. Suppose your prior credence distribution is P(Hi) = 1/n for 1  i  n and zero otherwise. The world in which Hi is true contains i possible self-locations, and all the possible worlds together contain s = 1 + 2 + … + n locations. Hence applying Elga’s restricted indifference principle yields P(Hi) = i/s. Suppose you subsequently learn that your birth rank is 1; call this evidence E1. By Bayes’ theorem, P(Hi|E1) = P(Hi)P(E1|Hi) / P(E1), where P(E1) = P(H1)P(E1|H1) + P(H2)P(E1|H2) + … + P(Hn)P(E1|Hn) = (1/s)(1) + (2/s)(1/2) + … + (n/s)(1/n) = n/s. So P(Hi|E1) = (i/s)(1/i)(s/n) = 1/n. That is, learning that your birth rank is 1 undoes the self-location shift, and restores your uniform prior. Suppose instead that you learn that your birth rank is k > 1; call this evidence Ek. Now P(Ek) = (k/s)(1/k) + ((k+1)/s)(1/(k+1)) + … + (n/s)(1/n) = (n–k)/s. Hence P(Hi|Ek) = 0 for i < k, and P(Hi|Ek) = (i/s)(1/i)(s/(n–k)) = 1/(n–k) for i  k. Again, this restores a uniform credence distribution over the remaining hypotheses. I conclude that the Doomsday Argument has no force.
	‘Halfers’ concerning Sleeping Beauty are likely to be unconvinced by the above argument. For example, Lewis (2001) maintains that there is no self-location shift in Beauty’s credences on waking, and learning that it is Monday increases her credence in heads to 2/3. Transposed to the context of the Doomsday argument, this underwrites the standard conclusion (confirmation of shorter human survival times). But I need not rehearse the many counterarguments to the halfer position here. I merely note (1) that being forced to take the Doomsday argument seriously is yet another cost of the halfer position; and (2) even if halfers are right that there is no self-location shift on waking, a case can be made that learning that it is Monday does no confirmatory work either (Lewis 2009).
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